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ADVICE GIVING AND PARTY LOYALTY: AN INFORMATIONAL MODEL FOR 
THE SOCIALISATION PROCESS OF NEW BRITISH MPS. 
ABSTRACT: Post-election socialisation has frequently been identified as a source of 
parliamentarians’ disposition towards party loyalty. Yet a recent study of the socialisation experiences 
of new members in the British Parliament, using tenure as proxy for socialisation, found little 
evidence of an effect on party loyalty (Rush and Giddings, 2011). This paper develops a new model of 
parliamentary socialisation and uses the same data to demonstrate that post-entry socialisation did in 
fact change legislators reported likeliness to behave in accordance with their party leadership’s 
wishes. Specifically, a framework based on information exchange (advice giving) is used to show that 
positive interactions with party actors are associated with increased loyalty. Controlling for initial 
levels of loyalty, members who received more useful advice from party actors were more likely to rate 
themselves as highly influenced by the party leadership. 
Keywords: British Politics, Cohesion, Parliaments, Parties, Socialisation, Surveys 
 
 
All institutions face a ‘new members’ problem. If they are to successfully renew themselves, they 
must have the ability to recruit appropriate new members. Yet this presents a numbers of challenges. 
New members are by definition outsiders with little experience of ‘how things are done here’, and as 
such are a potential threat to established practices. Conversely, experienced from the point of view of 
a new member, entering a new institution presents the problem of adapting to a predetermined role 
while retaining a sense of the purpose for which one joined. Parliaments face these problems in a 
particularly acute form, with new members entering in large groups at a time of maximum 
institutional disruption around elections. Most of these new members have little or no previous 
experience as legislators at a national level, but frequently do possess a strong sense of mission and a 
desire to make change (Rush and Giddings, 2011). As an added complication, few systems impose 
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extensive formal constraints on how members carry out their legislative duties beyond the formal 
rules of procedure, and British parliamentarians in particular have traditionally been interpreted to be 
entitled to use their own judgement in deciding how to vote. The job of constraining such independent 
agents in most systems therefore falls largely to the internal mechanisms of political parties. To do so 
parties deploy a diverse range of strategies, from control over career advancement and reselection to 
various forms of formal and informal discipline (Kam, 2009). When these fail, however, they rely on 
having previously inculcated norms of loyalty and deference to leadership (Kam, 2009). This 
inculcation of collective values is achieved via the process of socialisation; the transmission of norms 
such as party loyalty from established members of the parliamentary community to a new generation 
over time (Scott, 1971).  
This study presents a new analysis of this process of parliamentary socialisation. Instead of utilising a 
model based on parliamentary tenure as in previous socialisation studies, data from the Study of 
Parliament Group’s (SPG) surveys of new parliamentarians in the UK is used to develop a model of 
advice giving exchanges - a proxy for information acquisition - as a determinant of party loyalty. 
Drawing on work from the organisational socialisation field, as well as some classic sociological 
accounts, the model places information, through the mechanism of advice giving, at the centre of the 
socialisation process (Blau, 1964; Ostroff and Kozlowski, 1992; Cooper‐Thomas and Anderson, 
2002). Instead of expecting socialisation to consist of uniform changes over time, therefore, as tenure-
based studies have tended to assume, the paper uses measures of the helpfulness of advice from party 
actors to explore MPs’ learning process and demonstrate information acquisition as a proxy for 
socialisation. This measure is shown to be positively related to increased loyalty, as new members 
reciprocate for useful advice with loyalty to senior party colleagues. Consequently party loyalty can 
be seen to develop in part as the product of the social learning process which new MPs undergo. 
1. Loyalty and socialisation  
The focus here is on party loyalty as an individual disposition towards loyalty (Andeweg and 
Thomassen, 2010). Loyalty is a strong feeling of support or allegiance not directly related to 
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agreement, or any immediate expected gain or loss, resulting from association with the object of 
loyalty (Hirschman, 1970: p. 38). In Hirschman’s (1970) classic account, loyalty was an irrational 
attachment which nonetheless interacted with the strategic context, affecting individuals’ marginal 
choices about how and when to express dissent (Hirschman, 1970: pp. 76-106). In a parliamentary 
setting loyalty norms often have just such a marginal effect, getting the government ‘over the line’ 
when other incentives fail (Kam, 2009). This contrasts to standard measures of party loyalty which 
focus on the well-worn problem of ‘cohesion’ – the study of parliamentary rebellion, or, alternatively, 
the degree of ideological congruity between legislators of the same party (Krehbiel, 1999; Sieberer, 
2006; Kam, 2009). Measures applied to study these concepts are generally defined at the level of the 
party group or the legislature as a whole, from the comparatively simple (Rice, 1925) to the highly 
sophisticated (Poole, 2007). Causal explanations are thus also directed at the macro-level and to 
system- or party-level structural factors (Sieberer, 2006).  
By contrast, the analysis here uses individual level data on MPs’ experiences and self-reported party 
loyalty to demonstrate a socialisation effect on underlying dispositions towards loyalty. Socialisation 
can be characterised as a learning experience in which various forms of institutionally situated values 
are transmitted to newcomers. This may take a variety of forms, but frequently includes a degree of 
ritual and ceremony as well as more day-to-day experiences of group membership (Spencer, 1970). 
Successful socialisation is manifested in the reproduction of the roles and behaviours of the current 
generation in the new one over time (Mayer, 1970). In a legislative context, MPs are socialised to 
adopt the norms of loyal partisan behaviour, over and above normal partisanship, which are essential 
for parliamentary party groups to function as coherent blocs (Kam, 2009). 
Such post-election socialisation processes have long been identified as a source of party loyalty 
(Kornberg, 1967; Price and Bell, 1970; Searing, 1986; Kam, 2009). In one recent study Rosenblatt 
(2007) argues that British MPs undergo a socialisation process that underpins loyalty norms in British 
politics, with the experience even being compared to socialisation experiences in childhood. As she 
relates, ‘[one MP] remembered the experience as… comparable to starting at a new boarding school’, 
a commonly used analogy which ‘describes not only the atmosphere and surroundings, but also the 
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rules in place and the sense of hierarchy that exists between the new arrivals and the more established 
Members’ (Rosenblatt, 2007). Yet concrete evidence of the effect of such experiences has often been 
harder to detect, with pre-election attitudes argued to shape views more than incumbent experiences 
(Price and Bell 1969; Asher, 1973). Crowe’s (1983; 1986) frequently cited work links difference in 
loyalty to party identification but not length of service. Likewise, European Union scholars have 
failed to find evidence of systematic socialisation effects in the European Parliament, in spite of the 
prevalence of narratives about national legislators ‘going native’ as a result of exposure to EU 
institutions (Scully, 2005; Navarro, 2005). Rush and Giddings (2011) have recently examined the 
socialisation of new British MPs in one of few book-length treatments of the topic. With data from the 
1992-1997 and 1997-2001 cohort surveys of MPs from the Study of Parliament Group (SPG), which 
we also use here, they show that little consistent change over time was detected in measures ranking 
various possible role orientations, including supporting the party group (Rush and Giddings, 2011: p. 
112) and questions assessing the influence of party loyalty on an ordinal scale showed no clear pattern 
of increasing over time at the level of the party group mean (Rush and Giddings, 2011: pp. 113-116). 
Simple change over time at the aggregate level is, however, a poor proxy for socialisation. Changes in 
attitudes can and do take place for a variety of reasons. Change over time therefore both over- and 
under-estimates socialisation effects. Without a clearer definition, either changes which are 
unaccounted for by other measures are simply allotted to socialisation, or behavioural shifts masked 
by other factors may lead us to conclude socialisation had no effect. Thus, Kam (2009) points out ‘it 
is more precise to say that socialization is effective when MPs come to value the ‘right’ norms, to wit, 
loyalty, solidarity, and deference to leadership – and it is these norms rather than the amount of time 
the MP spends in parliament that constrain the MP’s behaviour’ (Kam, 2009: p. 194). In his analysis, 
however, individual-level differences in loyalty norms – measured through candidate surveys – 
remain an independent variable used to explain parliamentary behaviour (Kam, 2009). In this study, 
by contrast, information acquisition is used as a proxy for socialisation to explain differences in the 
strength of underlying loyalty norms, as well as how these change over time in new MPs. 
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2. Advice seeking and disposition towards loyalty 
As noted, socialisation is in essence an exercise in learning, specifically role-acquisition, in which an 
individual learns the technical and social knowledge required to function in a specialised setting. 
However traditional accounts of this process suffer from a failure to fully conceptualise how this 
works in practice. In classic functionalist accounts, the socialisation process was seen as dominated by 
the institutional side of the ‘new member’ dilemma. Roles were seen as predetermined, with 
individuals simply adapted to them via organisational tactics (Parsons, 1964; Van Maanen and Schein, 
1979). This institution-led view also informed early studies of legislative socialisation. Price and Bell 
(1970), for example, were concerned primarily with the “rule structure of Congress” and the “content 
and effect of the rules” on legislators’ behaviour. Models utilising tenure as a proxy for socialisation 
also tend to implicitly accept this definition, as they expect uniform effects from institutional 
pressures ‘working on’ on legislators over time (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 1983).  
Instead, I draw here on an alternative conception of the socialisation process which characterises it 
primarily as a form of information exchange (Blau, 1964). On this account, the experience of 
newcomers is dominated by a single imperative: the need for information. As well as being crucial for 
day-to-day effectiveness, the possession of knowledge about institutional practices is the most 
important marker of ‘insider’ status (Blau, 1964). Proactive information seeking is therefore central to 
the socialisation process. At the same time, however, this is a highly social process, with the most 
valuable information likely to be procured from more experienced colleagues. Miller and Jablin 
(1991), in a seminal article, distinguished between referent information; technical knowledge required 
to do the job, appraisal information; about the newcomers own performance and relational 
information; the nature of relationships with others in the organisation. These are interconnected, 
however, in as far as relational information is required to attain referent and appraisal information in 
an effective way – in short, to know who to ask for advice and how (Miller and Jablin, 1991).  
From the point of view of established members, however, the newcomers’ need for referent 
information presents an opportunity. As newcomers have few other resources, they reciprocate by 
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showing loyalty to those from whom they have received the most useful advice. This supports a 
hierarchy where newcomers seeking information become subordinated to more experienced advice 
givers (Blau, 1964: p. 185). While advice seeking makes newcomers proactive in their own 
socialisation, therefore, it also reinforces hierarchies based on specialisation and expertise, 
establishing seniority relationships with more experienced colleagues (Morrison, 2002; Contractor 
and Monge, 2002). This dynamic has more recently been conceived in terms of social capital (Fang, 
Duffy and Shaw, 2011). However the idea of advice giving as the sociological foundation of 
institutional power structures has a longer heritage, stretching back at least to Peter Blau's seminal 
work on the transactional nature of social interaction ‘Exchange and Power in Social Life’ (1964). To 
the current author’s knowledge, however, it has never been applied to parliamentary socialisation.1 
3. Hypotheses 
The advice-information model has a number of implications for the ‘new member’ problem in 
parliaments. In a legislative context tasks and roles are often not only highly complex but loosely 
defined and poorly institutionalised. As such relational information is likely to be extremely important 
as a source of learning, with party colleagues the most significant source of such information. Rush 
and Giddings (2011), for example, found that new members saw MPs of their own party as the most 
useful source of advice on their role (Rush and Giddings 2011: p. 75).   
Hypothesis One: New members who are satisfied with advice given by party actors will be 
the most familiar with the technical details of their role. 
Secondly, in relation to the central question of party loyalty addressed here, we expect that when party 
actors are seen as valuable sources of advice and information by new members this will result in an 
 
1 Although it has seen little use in political science, a considerable body of empirical literature from the 
organisational socialisation field attests to information acquisition behaviour, and the accompanying dynamic of 
advice giving, as a critical factor in successful institutional adaption to roles in a range fields, see for example 
Ostroff and Kozlowski, 1992: Cooper‐Thomas and Anderson, 2002; Bauer, Bodner, Tucker, Erdogan, and 
Truxillo, 2007.   
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increase in party loyalty in the same individuals (Fang, Duffy and Shaw, 2011). In Blau’s (1964) 
formulation, in return for the receipt of advice, new MPs incur a social debt which they repay by 
showing loyalty to senior party colleagues (Blau, 1964).  
Hypothesis Two: New members who receive useful advice from senior party actors will have 
an increased tendency towards loyalty to party leaders. 
However this situation is sensitive to the range of sources of advice available. When advice can be 
procured elsewhere its value as a social commodity declines and the advice-for-loyalty mechanism is 
weakened (Blau, 1964). This is particularly significant against the background of strengthening 
institutional support for new legislators in a number of countries (Steinack, 2012; Fox and Korris, 
2012). If the advice-information model is correct, such diversification in sources of advice is likely to 
weaken loyalty to the party leadership. We therefore expect that new members who are already 
satisfied with levels of official provision will show lower levels of party loyalty. 
Hypothesis Three: New members who are satisfied with official sources of advice will show 
lower levels of party loyalty. 
4. Suitability of the UK case 
The UK parliament represents a most likely case for the advice-information framework (Gerring, 
2007). As Steinack (2012) points out, the UK has low levels of formal institutional support but 
strongly embedded parliamentary parties. In her study, it was the only country in which the majority 
of legislators opposed any move to initiate formal compulsory training programs for new MPs 
(Steinack, 2012). Indeed those who were in favour of such a move specifically identified weakening 
the parties as the potential outcome. As one British MP argued, “…I’m absolutely certain that 
parliamentarians can benefit from it. What I do think is they need it sharp, fast, upfront and before 
they’ve fallen into the clutches of the whips and the system and go native” (Steinack, 2012). Thus a 
strong prima facie case can be made for the role of sources of information as a vehicle for party 
control in the British House of Commons.  
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4.1 Data: the Study of Parliament Group’s (SPG) socialisation surveys 
To test the model, the Study of Parliament Group’s (SPG) surveys of newly elected MPs in the 1992-
97 and 1997-2001 Parliaments are used (Rush, 2012). These panel surveys of British parliamentarians 
were used by Cowley (2002) and Rush and Giddings (2011), and were specifically designed to 
investigate new members socialisation. They provide a wealth of useful data on sources of 
information and advice for MPs, as well as measures of role perceptions, behavioural influences and 
career aspirations. The SPG surveyed new MPs in three waves; immediately after election, again in 
the middle of the parliamentary session and finally at the end. 267 MPs responded to at least one wave 
of the survey, a response rate of over 70% for both cohorts, while 93 MPs responded to both the initial 
and final waves, representing a response rate of 25.2% for new members in the 1992-1997 parliament 
and 25.1% for the 1997 cohort. The SPG surveys pay unique attention to the sources of advice and 
information available to MPs and represent the best data available to test the model. As Table 1 
shows, the subsample for which data is available from multiple waves is approximately 61% Labour 
MPs, with the majority in in the 1997 cohort. This is broadly representative of new members over this 
period given the large Labour majority in the 1997-2001 parliament, although in part this also reflects 
the cooperation of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in administering the survey (Rush, 2012).  
[Table 1 around here] 
Using surveys such as the SPG data entail relying on self-reported measures. This is sometimes 
viewed as controversial, as the connection between reporting and actual behaviour can be unclear or 
questionable. On the other hand, survey measures and longform interviews have frequently proven 
extremely useful in probing aspects of legislators’ experiences which ‘hard data’ analysis alone may 
be unable to capture (Heitshusen, Young and Wood, 2005). Ideally, survey data should be combined 
with hard measures to confirm predictions. Unfortunately the SPG data is anonymised and does not 
allow us to connect answers to relevant data such as parliamentary voting records. Anonymization 
also precludes the use of certain demographic controls which would ideally be included in a study of 
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loyalty, in particular the gender of an MP (Cowley and Childs, 2003) and the marginality of their 
constituency (Campbell, Cowley, Vivian and Wagner, 2016). 
Nonetheless a strong case can be made for the validity of the measure used here. In the first place, it is 
highly likely that this measure is correlated with real world behaviour. Kam (2009), for example, has 
already demonstrated using a similar measure derived from the 1992 British Candidate Survey (BCS) 
that such self-assessed measures of loyalty were a determinant of dissenting votes cast by MPs (Kam, 
2009: p. 189-203). Secondly, the aim is to assess underlying dispositions towards loyalty displayed by 
a legislator; that is, prior to being presented with a specific situation in which their party deploys 
formal and informal methods of discipline. A survey measure is well suited to this purpose as it 
effectively decontextualizes the loyalty norm by asking the member to reflect on it as a generality.  
While the SPG surveys did include a control group of longer serving MPs, I include only the new 
MPs in the analysis. In the first place, the organisational socialisation literature emphasises that the 
most important socialisation experiences involving information acquisition occur early on after 
organisational entry, when newcomers are most inexperienced in their roles (Cooper‐Thomas and 
Anderson, 2002). Secondly, using only new members allows us to effectively control for variation in 
legislative tenure, as all MPs in the data had the same amount of parliamentary experience in terms of 
at the time they took the survey. Instead of a separate control group, therefore, we control instead for 
the answers given by new MPs themselves in the first wave of the survey. We therefore measure 
within-case changes directly.  
5. Operationalisation of the variables 
5.1 Dependent variables 
The central prediction of the model is hypothesis two (H2); the positive effect of receiving useful 
advice from party actors on party loyalty. To test this, the dependent variable is drawn from a measure 
asking members to rate how strongly they were influenced by direction from the party leadership 
when deciding on how they acted and voted in Parliament; nearly always, usually, sometimes, rarely 
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or never. Answers on this measure may of course be driven in part by considerations beyond loyalty. 
However, subjects’ interpretation of the question as relating to the exercise of discipline is minimised 
by the reference to advice, not direction or formal whipping, and the framing of the question as one of 
influence on a personal decision. The majority of members nonetheless responded to these questions 
indicating a high relatively high degree of loyalty, with decisions ‘usually’ or ‘nearly always’ 
influenced by the party leadership (Rush and Giddings, 2011: pp. 113-116). At the same time, a 
significant minority reported lower scores. These lower scores were combined into a single category 
so that each MP’s level of loyalty was rated ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’.  This measure was included in 
all three waves of the survey, with the dependent variable being drawn from the third wave. 
Hypothesis one (H1) in the model predicts that parties will be the most significant source of learning 
for new MPs. For this prediction, the measure of procedural familiarity from the SPG dataset is used. 
Respondents were asked how familiar they were with parliamentary procedure; ‘very familiar’, 
‘somewhat familiar’, ‘not very familiar’ and ‘not at all familiar’. Knowledge of the parliamentary 
process, including procedure for debate, is crucial for British MPs. The House of Commons is 
generally considered a quintessential ‘arena’ legislature in which MPs primary skills revolve around 
debate. Moreover, not all MPs were able to adequately master these skills, with a significant minority 
reporting struggling even after months or years in the House (Rush and Giddings, 2011: p. 182). This 
part of the model therefore attempts to account for this via the advice giving mechanism, with 
usefulness of party advice expected to be a significant predictor of gains in procedural familiarity. 
This is included primarily to verify that reported usefulness of advice is actually associated with (self-
assessed) learning and not simply a reflection of a generally positive assessment of party actors. 
Again, this measure was included in all three waves of the survey, with the dependent variable drawn 
from the third (and final) wave. 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
The model incorporates two explanatory variables; advice from party actors and advice from the 
House of Commons (HoC) officials. Both are composites of multiple Likert-type items from the 
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survey which asked about the general usefulness of various specific sources of advice (i.e. a Likert 
scale). For the Party Advice measure, respondents’ answers for ‘MPs of their own party’, ‘officers of 
the parliamentary party’, ‘Ministers or frontbenchers’ and ‘other party officials’ were used to create 
an overall score. For House of Commons (HoC) Advice, responses for ‘Parliamentary Clerks’, 
‘Commons Library staff’ and ‘other Commons staff’ were aggregated in the same way. The response 
categories (‘not at all useful’, ‘not very useful’, ‘quite useful’ and ‘very useful’) were coded 1-4 while 
a do not know/no interaction response was coded missing.  
Scores for each specific actor were aggregated by calculating a mean score for each type of actor; the 
MP’s political party and the House of Commons (HoC) authorities. The resulting continuous variables 
therefore assess the overall usefulness of advice received from two classes of actors; officials of the 
House of Commons, and the MP’s party group. The items on advice usefulness were put to MPs 
twice; once in the second wave and again in the third wave. In order to minimise attrition between 
survey waves and create a more robust measure, both time points are used, so that if an MP failed to 
provide a score in one wave the score given in the other is used. If an MP provided two scores, an 
average of the two is taken.  
Both the party and HoC measures are approximately normally distributed and provide sufficient 
variation for analysis. While these measures are of not perfect proxies for information acquisition, 
they are in line with those used in the organisational socialisation literature (Ostroff and Kozlowski, 
1992; Cooper‐Thomas and Anderson, 2002). In addition, the procedural familiarity dependent 
variable allows us to assess the importance of sources of referent information directly by showing its 
relationship to a learning outcome, albeit a self-assessed one. 
5.3 Control variables 
The panel structure of the SPG data allows us to control for the responses given to the process 
familiarly and party loyalty variables in the first wave of the survey, immediately after MPs were 
elected. MPs entering the House for the first time may vary in their levels of loyalty for any number 
of reasons, from social and educational background to pre-parliamentary political experience 
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(Cowley, 2002; Allen, 2014). Although using data only from new MPs effectively controls for any 
unmeasured variance related to tenure, it does not account for the possibility that some MPs simply 
view interactions with party actors more favourable precisely because they are more loyal. By 
accounting for initial loyalty and process familiarity the possibility that results are driven by these 
endogenous factors is precluded. However, a number of other controls are also added to the model.   
First, a dummy is added for membership of the two cohorts in the study (1992 = 0, 1997 = 1). As 
Cowely (2002) and Rush and Giddings (2011) have pointed out, parliamentary cohorts are not 
identical in their background, outlook or behaviour and some natural variation can therefore be 
expected. Second, a further dummy is added for membership of the governing party (Yes = 1, No = 
0). Executives in parliamentary systems such as the UK rely on the backing of a majority for survival, 
as well as passing legislation, and are therefore be expected to devote more resources to maintaining 
the loyalty of backbenchers (Sieberer, 2006). Party-level factors also play a role in bolstering 
cohesion. As Raymond and Overby (2014) argue, “party labels… reflect a social identity that is 
independent of legislators’ preferences and the rules used by party leaders to enforce discipline.” This 
effect varies by party and extends well beyond parliament into the activist base, with previous British 
studies showing a much stronger effect for Labour at all levels than the Conservatives (Crowe, 1983). 
The model therefore also includes a control for party identification (Party ID). 
In terms of individual-level variables from the SPG data, whether an MP reported having ministerial 
aspirations is introduced as the final control. Governments in parliamentary democracies hold a near-
monopoly over career advancement and have used this to bolster loyalty (Kam, 2009; Godbout and 
Hoyland, 2016). As well as aiding cohesion directly via the so-called ‘payroll vote’ of legislators 
currently inside the government, those aspiring to ministerial office must prove their suitability by 
demonstrating consistent loyalty to the government’s policy. Kam (2009) argues that hope of 
promotion and career advancement is the most significant individual determinant of loyalty in roll-call 
voting. Likewise, Cowley (2002) found that MPs in the SPG dataset with no ministerial ambitions 
were five times more likely to cast dissenting votes than those who hoped to be promoted in the future 
(Cowley, 2002: p. 110).  
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Controlling for ministerial ambitions further minimises the possibility of reverse causality. As Allen 
(2014) points out, not all British MPs are created equal. In particular, those with prior Westminster 
experience as ‘special advisors’ or MPs’ assistants appear to be able to advance more quickly in their 
parliamentary careers (Allen, 2014). In which case, it may be that those with strong ministerial 
aspirations have been preselected as particularly loyal group, and receive extra advice and assistance 
merely as a result of being groomed for accelerated entry into the leadership. In order to separate the 
effect of career advancement from advice giving, therefore, I also control for whether a new MP still 
stated that they had ministerial ambitions at the end of the parliament.  
In addition to ministerial aspirations, two further variables are added to control for the pre-
parliamentary experiences of MPs. As noted, the SPG data is anonymised and cannot be connected 
directly to any MP. As such, it is not possible to control directly for demographic factors which 
Cowley (2002) found to be significant predictors of dissent in these cohorts, such as local government 
experience or trade union backgrounds in Labour MPs. Nonetheless, the first wave surveys did ask the 
related question of who newly elected MPs reached out to for advice in preparing to do the job before 
they entered parliament; other MPs, party officials or trade union contacts (answering “yes” or “no”). 
While the vast majority of new MPs had consulted other MPs, there was more variation in pre-entry 
contact with party officials and trade unions. Both of these are potentially significant factors. If a new 
MP reaches out to party officials, it is likely they have the strong pre-existing relationships to the 
party in central office identified by Allen (2014). By contrast, MPs who reached out to trade unions 
for advice before entering parliament are likely to have the connections in the broader labour 
movement which Cowley (2002) identified as a source of rebellious attitudes. 
6. Analysis 
6.1 Model Choice 
Given the structure of the data the preferred method for analysis is an ordered probit model (Winship 
and Mare, 1984). The ordered probit design allows for analysis of discrete dependent variables, like 
Likert-items, which can be placed on an ordinal scale and where an OLS regression is therefore 
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inappropriate (Fullerton, 2009). Both dependent variables fall into this category, as they ask 
respondents to place their level of party loyalty and knowledge of parliament into ordered categories. 
Ordered probit models estimate coefficients and the location of thresholds (or ‘cut points’) between 
each category of the dependent variable. These replace the constant estimated in other models but are 
not of substantive interest, though are presented in Table 2 to indicate which variables were 
significant. Substantive effects are shown in Tables 3 and 4 in terms of predicted probabilities for 
categories of the dependent variable. These are estimated for significant variables, with all other 
variables held at their means. Variables are entered stepwise into the model, beginning with the party 
and official (HoC) advice variables, as well as the control for initial loyalty/procedure familiarity. 
6.2 Findings 
[Table 2 around here] 
Table 2 shows coefficient estimates for the ordered probit regressions conducted for party loyalty and 
procedural familiarity. As per hypothesis two, usefulness of advice from party actors was indeed a 
significant predictor of party loyalty and remaining significant across all models. On the other hand 
official advice from the House of Commons was not associated increased or decreased loyalty. The 
results therefore confirm the central relationship assumed in the information exchange model between 
advice giving and party loyalty. Moreover, as hypothesis one predicts, party advice was also 
associated with increased procedural familiarity, whereas official advice was not. As predicted by the 
theoretical model, therefore, advice giving interactions with party actors were associated both with 
increased loyalty and greater functional knowledge of the MPs role. The results therefore strongly 
indicate that useful advice based interactions with party actors not only boosted loyalty, but were also 
related to enhanced information acquisition. 
[Table 3 around here] 
Among the control variables, cohort, ministerial ambitions and high initial levels of loyalty all proved 
significant. Those with high initial levels of party loyalty were highly likely to retain their views 
through the course of the parliament. In addition, as expected members with ministerial ambitions 
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were more likely to report high levels of loyalty to the party leadership. However, ministerial 
ambitions had no effect on procedural familiarity, with no significant difference between MPs. 
Interestingly, in absolute terms, MPs with ministerial ambitions did show higher levels of procedural 
familiarity, with 23.6% who answered ‘yes’ reporting that they were ‘very familiar’ with 
parliamentary procedure compared to 6.45% for those who answered ‘no’.  However they also 
reported a higher initial level, with only 8.77% reporting that they were ‘not at all familiar’ with 
parliament compared to 18.18% of the no ambitions group. As our model controls for this initial level, 
the non-significance of this variable shows instead only that ambitions were not associated with any 
increased knowledge of procedure. At the same time, therefore, it reinforces that the main variable of 
interest – the usefulness of party advice – was associated both with more rapid learning and increased 
loyalty compared with initial scores. 
[Table 4 around here] 
Both of the controls for pre-entry advice also proved significant for the loyalty measure, indicating the 
pre-parliamentary background of MPs also played a role. However, only one of these was in the 
expected direction. While MPs with trade union links proved less loyal as predicted, this was also the 
case for MPs who had reached out to party officials for pre-entry advice.  One possible explanation 
for this is that those who took active steps to reach out to officials pre-entry were in fact the least 
experienced in national party affairs. By contrast, well connected new MPs with previous national 
political experience did not reach out to party officials in preparing for the job because they did not 
feel the need to. In any case, while these background factors did impact on loyalty, the lack of an 
effect on procedural familiarity indicates that this was not related to the same advice-information 
mechanism which is evident from the post-entry party advice measure. 
Harder to interpret is the significance of the cohort variable (Coef. = -1.04) for partly loyalty in our 
model. The mean level of party loyalty diverged significantly over time between the two cohorts 
represented in the data. While the average score at the beginning of the parliaments was very similar 
between both cohorts in wave 1 of the surveys, there was subsequently a marked rise in the 1992 
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cohort and the opposite - a steep decline - in the 1997-2001 group. Unobserved cohort related 
variables therefore clearly also affected party loyalty. It should be noted that there were indeed a 
number of interesting differences between the two groups. The 1992-1997 cohort entered parliament 
at the beginning of a fourth term of Conservative government with a slim majority facing an 
increasingly tough fight against a resurgent Labour Party under leader and future prime-minister Tony 
Blair from 1994. By contrast, the 1997 cohort entered parliament during a time of enormous 
disruption, with a Labour landslide and a rate of turnover unprecedented in a peace time election after 
a four-to-five-year election cycle.2 The 1997 cohort were also dramatically more diverse, with higher 
numbers of women and ethnic minority MPs than in any previous parliament. All these factors may 
have played a role. However, we should note here simply that the significance of party advice is not 
affected by the dummy and therefore this result does not obviate the main conclusions reached here. 
 [Figure 1 around here] 
In order to illustrate the substantive effect of advice on party loyalty and procedural familiarity, the 
results of the regression model can be interpreted in terms of predicted probabilities. Tables 3 and 4 
show results for the party advice variable as a set of predicted probabilities for the various outcomes, 
with other variables are held at their means. As they show, an MP who on average rated party advice 
as ‘very useful’ was most likely to be at least somewhat familiar with parliamentary procedure (.66) 
and to report a high level of party loyalty (.72). By contrast, an MP who rated party advice as ‘not at 
all useful’ was much more likely be ‘not very familiar’ with parliamentary procedure (.34 compared 
to .02 for an MP who found advice ‘very useful) and to report a low influence by party leaders on the 
loyalty measure (.55). 
Indeed, at all levels, increases in reported usefulness of party advice were associated with increased 
loyalty and familiarity. As Figure 1 shows, the probability of an MP reporting the highest category in 
each variable (‘High’ loyalty and ‘Very Familiar’) increase relatively uniformly as scores for party 
advice rise. The relationship between party advice, procedural knowledge and party loyalty therefore 
 
2 The1945 election saw a larger turnover (496), in part due to a very large number of retirements given the ten-
year parliament which preceded it and also because of the Labour landslide which occurred in the same year.  
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approximates exactly the kind of smooth increases we would expect if loyalty was a ‘commodity’ 
exchanged for information in the way the model implies. There is no apparent threshold denoting a 
distinct group which was more loyal, and thus receiving intense advice and assistance compared to an 
excluded and disloyal group, as we might expect were the ‘preselection for leadership’ logic as 
outlined above driving the results (Allen, 2014).  
In sum, the results of the regression model provide support for the hypotheses outlined in the advice-
information model of dispositions toward party loyalty. As per H1, parties appear to be the dominant 
actors in the functional aspects legislative socialisation. MPs satisfaction with advice from party 
actors was associated with significantly faster leaning of parliamentary procedure. Moreover, as 
suggested by H2, they are able to use their dominance of the channels for acquiring referent 
information (advice giving) to reinforce norms of loyalty to the leadership in new MPs. This suggests 
that other authors may have underestimated the extent to which this is the case (Asher, 1973; Crowe, 
1983; Rush and Giddings, 2011). On the other hand, interaction with the House of Commons 
authorities seemed to play a smaller role than some have envisaged in terms of functional 
socialisation, at least at the time of these surveys (Rush and Giddings, 2011). Not only was official 
advice not associated with accelerated learning, it may even have had modest negative effect on party 
loyalty. However, as the effect was not significant, we cannot confirm H3 from these results. The 
broader systemic role of official advice thus remains unclear.  
7. Discussion 
This paper has presented a new theoretical approach to explain the connection between parliamentary 
socialisation and party loyalty. Instead of using legislative tenure as a proxy for socialisation, this 
process was instead conceptualised as an information exchange in which loyalty norms emerge as a 
by-product of the social learning process which new members undergo. This is in line with the 
expectations literature on organisational socialisation as it has developed in other fields, which finds 
‘advice’ effects not only on role-specialisation and loyalty but also organisational commitment and 
career satisfaction (Cooper‐Thomas and Anderson, 2002). These results indicate that the same or 
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similar dynamics are also operative in legislative socialisation. The advice-information model 
outlined here thus provides plausible microfoundations for a model of the socialisation effects on 
party loyalty in new parliamentarians, and challenges the conventional wisdom that this is not the 
case. Parties do in fact socialise new MPs and change behaviour in ways relevant to party loyalty; 
specifically, by inculcating norms of loyalty and deference to the leadership through advice giving.  
Nonetheless these conclusions have potentially wide-ranging implications. That parties are important 
vehicles for legislators to develop a working knowledge of their role is perhaps unsurprising. 
However, the results emphasise that learning mechanisms play important secondary roles for 
legislative politics in terms of bolstering party loyalty. Given recent calls for greater institutional 
provision for parliamentarians professional development (Fox and Korris, 2010; Coghill, Lewis and 
Steinack, 2012) the conclusion that existing learning mechanisms through parties play a role in 
maintaining party loyalty should cause us to think more deeply about the potential effects of such 
reforms. On the one hand, independence on the part of legislators is increasingly part of what the 
public demands from politicians (Allen and Birch, 2012). As such, the issue of socialisation itself is 
often seen critically through the lens of public perception of the growing separateness of the ‘political 
class’ from the day to day concerns of citizens (Rosenblatt, 2007). Yet cohesion is both necessary for 
effective governance (Kam, 2009: p. 10). Thus if one consequence of encouraging legislators to 
eschew traditional advice relationships within their party is to compromise the mechanisms through 
which they come to view loyalty as an important norm, then a secondary consequence of 
modernisation may be a weakening of party unity, and, ultimately, public trust. 
A number of caveats apply to these results. In the first place, they relate to a single case over a 
comparatively short period of time for which data was available. In addition, as the bulk of the SPG 
data was collected during the 1990s, the specific conclusions reached about the House of Commons in 
this study should properly be considered historic. The Commons has undergone considerable 
institutional development in the last two decades, with substantially greater provision of formal 
training and advice for now MPs. There has also been a profusion of sources of advice from new 
institutions such and the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA), which now provides 
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induction courses on the expenses system. While in this study parties appeared to be the dominant 
informational actors, therefore, this may not still be the case today. 
More importantly for the theoretical model presented here, however, are a number of other limitations 
imposed by the data which must be noted in order not to overinterpret these results. Firstly, as noted, 
the SPG surveys only tracked MPs over their first parliamentary term, and thus we cannot assess the 
long term effects of advice related socialisation. Thus, while Kam’s (2009) work on socialisation has 
demonstrated that loyalty norms are important in the long run, the role of the form of information 
based socialisation advanced in this study remains unclear.Second, the combination of anonymised 
data and a comparatively small sample for multivariate analysis also impose limits on what can be 
concluded from this study. For example, recent research has demonstrated that parliamentary dissent 
is a valence signal which MPs in marginal constituencies can use to appeal to voters (Campbell, 
Cowley, Vivian and Wagner, 2016), though the effect of such fixed factors as electoral marginality is 
to some degree accounted for by controlling for initial loyalty.  
Another missing demographic factor in particular bears mentioning in this respect, however. Gender 
is a factor in parliamentary dissent in the UK. Indeed, this was especially salient for the 1997-2001 
cohort, in which Labour women were initially less likely to dissent but became significantly more so 
over time (Cowley and Childs, 2003). Importantly for this study, advice networks themselves are 
frequently gendered. While little of the organisational socialisation literature focusing on information 
acquisition specifically addresses gender, considerable attention to gender has been paid by the related 
literature on mentoring in career development. Scholars have identified a lack of such mentoring as a 
key problem in corporate life, with women often struggling to find mentors in male-dominated 
professions. Consequently they often lack access to sources of advice available to their male 
colleagues (Mullen, 1994). While this study was not able to address the role of gender, therefore, this 
may well have been a factor and should be addressed in future studies of parliamentary socialisation. 
Lastly, as the results indicate that socialisation processes are not uniform between parliamentarians or 
across parliamentary cohorts, future research clearly needs to address the issue of socialisation in a 
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longer term perspective. This may prove extremely challenging, however, given the lack of 
appropriate long-term survey data on parliamentarians. It may therefore be profitable to develop a 
comparative framework. As noted, there is reason to believe that party-based learning and informal 
socialisation for new MPs is likely to be particularly significant in Britain and other Westminster 
systems where institutional support is lower (Steinack, 2012). Thus an alternative approach would be 
to investigate whether systems with higher levels of institutional support for legislators have generally 
lower levels of party loyalty when controlling for other structural factors (Siberer, 2006). In any 
event, further investigation into the systemic effects of parliamentarians’ learning process on party 
dynamics is surely warranted. 

















Table 1 Party Identification and Cohort Membership in SPG Sample 
 
 Cohort  
Party 1992 1997 Total 
    
Labour  17 40 57 
 (18.3) (43.0) (61.3) 
    
Conservative 11 9 20 
 (11.8) (9.7) (21.5) 
    
Others 4 12 16 
 (4.3) (12.9) (17.2) 
    
Total 32 61 93 
 (34.4) (65.6) (100) 
 
Notes: Based on MPs who provided answers in the first and last wave of the SPG survey. Others category 
comprises minor parties and independents; Liberal Democrat, Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party (SNP), 
Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), (Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). 
Relative frequencies are in parentheses. 
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Table 2 Estimates for Party Loyalty and Procedural Familiarity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












       
Party Advice 0.982*** 0.948** 1.275** 0.656* 0.641* 0.633* 
 (0.290) (0.302) (0.391) (0.283) (0.293) (0.305) 
       
HoC Advice 0.0651 -0.0264 0.355 0.0129 0.0175 0.0192 
 (0.244) (0.255) (0.318) (0.237) (0.244) (0.255) 
       
Cohort  -0.858* -1.128**  0.168 0.180 
  (0.335) (0.409)  (0.316) (0.325) 
Party (Other)       
Conservative   0.0952 -0.423  0.184 0.161 
  (0.497) (0.581)  (0.509) (0.523) 
Labour  -0.449 -0.404  -0.628 -0.596 
  (0.449) (0.535)  (0.454) (0.469) 
       
Government Status  0.0490 0.566  0.105 0.111 
  (0.352) (0.429)  (0.336) (0.346) 
Min. Ambition (No)       
Don’t Know   1.052+   0.169 
   (0.547)   (0.453) 
Yes   1.639***   0.333 
   (0.456)   (0.344) 
Pre-Entry Advice       
Party Officials   -1.408***   0.218 
   (0.364)   (0.284) 
Trade Union   -0.984*   -0.105 
   (0.453)   (0.411) 
       
Loyalty (Wave 1) 1.100*** 1.339*** 1.441***    
 (0.242) (0.279) (0.344)    
       
Familiarity (Wave 1)    0.425** 0.332+ 0.347+ 
    (0.164) (0.172) (0.179) 
cut1       
_cons 4.041*** 3.283** 5.521** 0.378 -0.190 0.109 
 (1.158) (1.249) (1.809) (0.984) (1.150) (1.206) 
cut2       
_cons 6.081*** 5.499*** 8.636*** 1.637+ 1.107 1.435 
 (1.231) (1.319) (1.989) (0.937) (1.106) (1.158) 
cut3       
_cons    4.073*** 3.690** 4.042*** 
    (1.016) (1.168) (1.227) 
N 91 91 89 91 91 90 
pseudo R2 0.191 0.258 0.462 0.091 0.131 0.145 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0040 0.0073 0.0303 
Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4 Predicted Probabilities for Procedure Familiarity 
   
Procedure Familiarity  
 
     
Party Advice Not at All Not Very Somewhat Very 
     
Very Useful 0.000251 0.0154 0.660*** 0.325** 
 (0.000593) 
 
(0.0162) (0.117) (0.128) 
Quite Useful 0.00221 0.0620** 0.797*** 0.138*** 
 (0.00340) 
 
(0.0264) (0.0487) (0.0396) 
Not Very Useful 0.0135 0.174** 0.770*** 0.0427 
 (0.0177) 
 
(0.0791) (0.0698) (0.0318) 
Not at All Useful 0.0571 0.343** 0.591*** 0.00929 
 (0.0791) (0.175) (0.212) (0.0158) 
     
 
Notes: probabilities calculated from model 6 as shown in Table 2. All other variables held at means. 
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Table 3 Predicted Probabilities for Party Loyalty 
   
Party Loyalty 
      
         
Advice  Low Medium   High    
         
Very Useful 0.000108 0.279*   0.721***    
 (0.000267) (0.146)   (0.146)    
         
Quite Useful 0.00767 0.747***   0.245***    
 (0.00750) (0.0647)   (0.0628)    
 





   
0.0247 
   
 (0.0835) (0.0751)   (0.0257)    
         
Not at All Useful 0.550* 0.449   0.000595    
 (0.282) (0.281)   (0.00170)    
         
 
Notes: probabilities calculated from model 3 as shown in Table 2. All other variables held at 
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Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities for Maximum Party Loyalty and Familiarity Scores  
[Figure 1 here] 
Notes: plot shows predicted probabilities for the highest response categories of the loyalty and familiarity items, 
full results for which are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. Lines show adjusted probabilities with confidence 
intervals at 95%. All other variables are held at their means. 
 
 
Advice Giving and Party Loyalty   26 
 
Bibliography 
Allen, N. and Birch, S. (2012) 'On either side of a moat? Elite and mass attitudes towards right and 
wrong', European Journal of Political Research, 51(1), 89-116. 
Allen, P. (2014) Bring in the professionals: how pre-parliamentary political experience affects 
political careers in the House of Commons. Birkbeck, University of London. 
Asher, H. B. (1973) 'The learning of legislative norms', American Political Science Review, 67(02), 
499-513. 
Bauer, T. N., Bodner, T., Erdogan, B., Truxillo, D. M. and Tucker, J. S. (2007) 'Newcomer 
adjustment during organizational socialization: a meta-analytic review of antecedents, 
outcomes, and methods', Journal of applied psychology, 92(3), 707. 
Blau, P. M. (1964) Exchange and power in social life, New York, Transaction Publishers. 
Campbell, R., Cowley, P., Vivyan, N., and Wagner, M. (2016). 'Legislator dissent as a valence signal'. 
British Journal of Political Science, 24(1). 
Coghill, K., Lewis, C. and Steinack, K. (2012) 'How should elected members learn parliamentary 
skills: an overview', Parliamentary Affairs, 65(3), 505-19. 
Contractor, N. S. and Monge, P. R. (2002) 'Managing knowledge networks', Management 
Communication Quarterly: McQ, 16(2), 249. 
Cooper‐Thomas, H. and Anderson, N. (2002) 'Newcomer adjustment: The relationship between 
organizational socialization tactics, information acquisition and attitudes', Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 75(4), 423-37. 
Cowley, P. (2002) Revolts and rebellions: Parliamentary voting under Blair, London, Politico's. 
Cowley, P, and Childs, S. (2003) 'Too spineless to rebel? New Labour's women MPs." British Journal 
of Political Science 33(3), 345-365. 
Crowe, E. (1983) 'Consensus and structure in legislative norms: Party discipline in the House of 
Commons', The Journal of Politics, 45(04), 907-31. 
Crowe, E. (1986) 'The web of authority: Party loyalty and social control in the British House of 
Commons', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 161-85. 
Fang, R., Duffy, M. K. and Shaw, J. D. (2011) 'The organizational socialization process: Review and 
development of a social capital model', Journal of Management, 37(1), 127-52. 
Fox, R. and Korris, M. (2012) 'A fresh start? The orientation and induction of new MPs at 
Westminster following the 2010 general election', Parliamentary Affairs, 65(3), 559-75. 
Fullerton, A. S. (2009) 'A conceptual framework for ordered logistic regression models', Sociological 
methods & research, 38(2), 306-47. 
Gerring, J. (2007) 'Is there a (viable) crucial-case method?', Comparative Political Studies, 40(3), 
231-53. 
Advice Giving and Party Loyalty   27 
 
Godbout, J.-F. and Høyland, B. (2015) 'Unity in Diversity? The Development of Political Parties in 
the Parliament of Canada, 1867–2011', British Journal of Political Science, FirstView, 1-25. 
Heitshusen, V., Young, G. and Wood, D. M. (2005) 'Electoral Context and MP Constituency Focus in 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom', American Journal of 
Political Science, 49(1), 32-45. 
Hirschmann, A. O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Kam, C. J. (2009) Party discipline and parliamentary politics, Cambridge University Press. 
Kornberg, A. (1967) Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament, New York, 
Rinehart and Winston  
Krehbiel, K. (1999) 'Paradoxes of parties in congress', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 31-64. 
Mayer, P. (1970) Socialisation by peers; the Youth Organisation of the Red Xhosa. Socialisation: the 
approach from social anthropology. . London: Tavistock. 
Miller, V. D. and Jablin, F. M. (1991) 'Information seeking during organizational entry: Influences, 
tactics, and a model of the process', Academy of Management Review, 16(1), 92-120. 
Morrison, E. W. (2002) 'Newcomers' relationships: The role of social network ties during 
socialization', Academy of management Journal, 45(6), 1149-60. 
Mullen, E. J. (1994). 'Framing the mentoring relationship as an information exchange', Human 
Resource Management Review, 4(3), 257-281. 
Navarro, J. (2005) Converging Patterns of Behaviour in the European Union? The Limited Impact of 
Socialisation on the Members of the European Parliament. 3rd ECPR Conference, Budapest, 
September. 
Ostroff, C. and Kozlowski, S. W. (1992) 'Organizational socialization as a learning process: The role 
of information acquisition', Personnel psychology, 45(4), 849-74. 
Parsons, T. (1964) Social Structure and Personality Free Press of Glencoe. 
Poole, K. T. (2007) 'Changing Minds? Not in Congress!', Public Choice, 131(3-4), 435-51. 
Price, C. M. and Bell, C. G. (1969) 'Pre-legislative sources of representational roles', Midwest Journal 
of Political Science, 254-70. 
Price, C. M. and Bell, C. G. (1970) 'The rules of the game: political fact or academic fancy?', The 
Journal of Politics, 32(04), 839-55. 
Raymond, C. D. and Overby, L. M. (2014) 'What’s in a (Party) name? Examining preferences, 
discipline, and social identity in a parliamentary free vote', Party Politics, 
1354068814549346. 
Rice, S. A. (1925) 'The behavior of legislative groups: a method of measurement', Political Science 
Quarterly, 40(1), 60-72. 
Rosenblatt, G. (2007) 'From one of us to one of them: The socialisation of new MPs', Parliamentary 
Affairs, 60(3), 510-17. 
Advice Giving and Party Loyalty   28 
 
Rush, M. (2012) Parliamentary Socialisation: the Learning Process of New Members of Parliament, 
1992-2001. [data collection]. UK Data Service. 
Rush, M. and Giddings, P. (2011) Parliamentary socialisation: learning the ropes or determining 
behaviour? London, Springer. 
Scott, J. F. (1971) Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. 
Scully, R. (2005) Becoming Europeans?: attitudes, behaviour, and socialization in the European 
Parliament, Oxford University Press, USA. 
Searing, D. D. (1986) 'A theory of political socialization: Institutional support and deradicalization in 
Britain', British Journal of Political Science, 16(03), 341-76. 
Sieberer, U. (2006) 'Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis', The Journal 
of Legislative Studies, 12(2), 150-78. 
Spencer, P. (1970) The function of ritual in the socialization of the Samburu Moran. in P. Mayer (ed) 
Socialization: The approach from social anthropology. pp. 127-57. 
Steinack, K. (2012) 'Between Apathy and Enthusiasm: An International Comparison of MPs' 
Attitudes Towards Parliamentary Training', Parliamentary Affairs, gss021. 
Van Maanen, J. and Schein, E. H. (1979) 'Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization', Research 
in Organizational Behavior, 1, 209-64. 
Winship, C. and Mare, R. D. (1984) 'Regression models with ordinal variables', American 
Sociological Review, 512-25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
